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 The Subject of Law 
JohnFrow 
his  paper is  part of a larger piece of work on juridical dis-
course in which I try to elaborate a general description of the 
discursive  and  interdiscursive  structures  of the  law  and  to 
specify  some  of the  central  doctrinal  categories  of contemporary 
law. The category of legal subject has an exemplary status in such a 
project for a number of reasons: it is constructed, in historically dif-
ferential ways, through a diversity of overlapping positions in legal 
and  para-legal  practices  and languages;  it covers both human and 
non-human entities;  it. is  formed in direct relation to  the juridical-
/economic  concept  of property;  and  it is  closely  linked,  as  both 
foundation and effect, to  the philosophical category of subject. My 
account here is necessarily cursory, but it should be apparent that it 
has implications, in part, for the broader debate that has taken place 
in recent years around the concept of the subject. 
When the French jurist Bernard Edelman speaks of the "juridical 
production of the real" he defines it as "something that can fall under 
juridical  categories, hence  also  under the juridical category of the 
real,  that is,  the  real  as  object in law,  susceptible to  appropriation, 
sale and contracts". (1979: 37) Edelman's language alludes precisely 
to the etymology of the word "real". Webster has this entry: 
real [ME, real, relating to things (in law), fr.  ML, LL; 
ML rea/is, relating to things (in law), fr.  LL, real, fr.  L 
res, thing, fact; akin to Skt rai, property] 1.: of or relat-
ing to fixed, permanent, or immovable things (as lands 
or tenements) ... 
The elemental categorical structure of any  developed legal system, 
the  nucleus  from  which all  other categories can be  derived,  is  the 
relation  between  a  subject  in law  and  an  object  in law  (that  is, 
property).  The  structure  of the  relation between persona and  res 
68 yields  a  basic  scheme  of subject-object  relations  and  of relations 
between subjects.  By  further  describing  the  qualifications  and  the 
acts  of subjects,  we  can derive  from  it  the  entailed  categories  of 
rights and obligations; of acts and intentions; and of grievances and 
remedies.  Even those  areas of law (such as  constitutional, interna-
tional,  and  corporate law)  which do  not deal  with persons or per-
sonal property nevertheless operate by  analogy with the concept of 
person. 
The surface structure of the relation between persona and res is, 
however, misleading. Pashukanis argues that the relation of a person 
to  a  thing  has  no  legal  significance.  (1978:  122)  Its  real  form  is 
therefore  that  of a  relation  between subjects,  but conceived nega-
tively,  as  a relation of exclusion from the use and disposition of an 
object. This is  the structure of the distinction between the two fun-
damental forms  of actions in Roman law, and of rights in modem 
civil and common law: rights in rem and rights in personam. 
Rights in personam are singular, imposing an obligation against a 
particular person; rights in rem are general, asserting an entitlement 
to  exclude all  other persons, or a determinate set of other persons, 
from my property. In this categorical system persona and res are not 
entities but relational stmctures. Thus a "person", persona, is  con-
stituted by the possession of a bundle of rights  (or,  in Roman law, 
causes of action) and obligations, and conversely what is  owned is 
not a material entity but an aggregate of rights defined within a legal 
system. I own, not a piece of land, but a set of rights of use and ex-
clusion over the land; and my status as a legal subject is constituted 
in  this  instance  by  the  rights  to  which  I  am  entitled  and  the 
obligations I incur. 
Both of these categories are thus defined within the sphere of cir-
culation, where the alienation and acquisition of property take place 
under the sign of the formally equal status of subjects. (Marx, 1973: 
241  and 243) This description is  not tme of feudal  law,  where  the 
creation of the fee depends upon an essential inequality of status - al-
though even here it is  the free  acceptance of status that constitutes 
the  essence  of the  feudal  gift;  but for  both  Roman  law  and  for 
bourgeois  civil  and  common  law  systems  it  is  the  apparently 
autonomous "form of the  subject in  law  that fixes  social  relations 
and allows the  real  to  be  put into circulation as  an object-in-law". 
(Edelman, 1979: 92) Classical Marxist theory adds two corollaries to 
this.  First, it opposes to  the hypostatized sphere of circulation- the 
69 sphere of production, where quite different relations between agents 
obtain. Second, it argues that the originary mode of legal possession 
is  self-possession - that is, as Edelman puts it, "in its very structure 
the subject in law is  constituted on the concept of free ownership of 
itself'. (1979:  69)  This  free  ownership of oneself (which contrasts 
with the slave's inability to dispose of him or herself on the market) 
is  the foundation of the freedom of ownership in general. Pashukanis 
thus  (unlike  Hegel)  accords  the  category  of  the  subject  logical 
priority over that of property, because "property becomes the basis 
of the  legal  form  only  when it becomes  something which can be 
freely disposed of in the market. The category of the subject serves 
precisely  as  the  most general  expression of this  freedom".  (1978: 
110) 
This  repetition  of the  commodity  relation by  the  legal  relation 
does not, however, diminish the active force of the latter in the con-
stitution of the legal subject. One of the forms this takes is an active 
invocation  and  identification of complexly  constituted  subjects  as 
legal  subjects  through  the  use  of  particular  grammatical  forms. 
Daube,  for  example,  comments  on  the  transition  in  early  Roman 
legislation from the form "If a man murders another man, he shall be 
put  to  death",  to  the  later,  more  abstract,  less  narrative  and  more 
categorical  form  "whoever murders  a  man shall be put to  death". 
( 1956:  6) This "whoever" corresponds, I think, to Michel Pecheux's 
description of the "empty" relative clause ("celui qui"), often in con-
junction with a future anterior, as a primary mode of interpellation of 
the  legal subject.  (1982:  110) Another manifestation of the specifi-
city of the juridical constitution of the subject form is the simple dis-
junction between human being  and  person,  and between "natural" 
and "legal" fonns of the person. These disjunctions hinge on the dif-
ferential  distribution of rights (for example, citizenship rights). The 
core of the argument is this: 
A person is such, not because he is human, but because 
rights and duties are ascribed to him. The person is the 
legal  subject  or  substance  of which  the  rights  and 
duties  are  attributes  ...  Every full  citizen is  a person; 
other  human  beings,  namely,  subjects  who  are  not 
citizens, may be persons. But not every human being is 
necessarily  a person, for a person is  capable of rights 
and  duties,  and  there  may  well  be  human  beings 
having no  legal rights,  as  was  the  case with slaves in 
English  law.  (Black's  Law  Dictionary,  1968:  entry 
70 under "person") 
In Roman law,  the paterfamilias "is the only full  person known to 
the law. His children, of whatever age, though they are citizens and 
therefore  have  rights  in  public  law,  are  subject  to  his  unfettered 
power of life and death. Again, oniy he can own property, and anyth-
ing which  his  children  acquire  belongs  to  him  alone".  (Nicholas, 
1962: 65) 
The slave is understood in Roman law as an instrmnentum rather 
than a person (although the slave is differentiated from animals as an 
instrumentum  vocale  rather  than  an  instrumentum  mutum). 
Roman  citizens  captured  into  slavery  entered  the  limbo  state  of 
postliminium, in which their civil  rights were suspended during the 
period of their captivity. If a prisoner returned, tl-tese  rights 
revived automatically and retrospectively; if  he died in 
captivity his death was deemed to have occurred at the 
moment of his capture. This principle applied to 1ights, 
but not to  "facts", i.e., to  legal relationships which re-
quired for their existence some physical manifestation. 
Such  relationships  did  not  revive  automatically,  but 
had to  be physically resumed. Thus possession ended 
on capture and if resumed on return was a new posses-
sion dating from that moment; similarly the captive's 
marriage came to  an end and did not revive unless and 
until  a  married  relationship  was  by . agreement 
resumed. (Nicholas, 1962: 71-2) 
Finally,  the  insane  have  an  ambivalent status  in both  ancient  and 
modem law, with the criterion of autonomous will  - of "self-posses-
sion" - tending to deprive them of the status of person. It is possible 
to  plot  back  from  this  exclusion  to  reconstmct  the  particular 
doctrines of responsibility and causality which give it its force. Thus 
Goodrich writes that 
the  legal  individual  or  legal  subject  is  a  very 
specialized  and  distinct  rhetorical  person  ...  a  unity 
constructed upon the basis of its past acrions. The legal 
subject cannot revoke or renounce its  deeds,  the  legal 
subject is  the  straighforward cause of its  deeds (acts) 
and  it  is  morally  and  legally  responsible  for  those 
deeds  - utterances,  actions  and  omissions.  The  legal 
71 subject is  a static unity in  the sense that it cannot avoid 
the  legal  imputation of a causal  relation between past 
acts and present responsibility. (Good1ich, 1986: 204) 
Horwitz has traced the shift from an individualizing doctrine of "ob-
jective  causality"  in  nineteenth  century  tort  law,  based  on  the 
metaphors  of  a  distinction  between  "remote"  and  "proximate" 
causes  and  of objective "chains of causation",  to  the  probabilistic 
twentieth century doctrine of "foreseeable consequences". The two 
ideologies imply different forms  of legal  subject in each case,  but 
both suppose as  absolute  particular fonns of causality and respon-
sibility. (Horwitz, 1982: 201-13) 
In addition to  "natural" persons, tl1e  concept of person is applied 
in modern legal systems to certain non-human entities - in particular, 
and subject to  certain conditions of registration and jurisdiction, to 
corporations and to  governmental  associations.  In his  classic paper 
of 1938 Wolff distinguishes four main doctrines on the nature of the 
juristic person. The first  is  ilie  Fiction Theory,  according to  which 
only human beings can be persons and so the subjects of rights; as a 
consequence, "corporations, States, foundation<>  are not persons, but 
they are treated as if they were", by a legal fiction.  (1938: 496) The 
second  theory  is  iliat  enunciated  by  Bekker,  Brinz,  and  Demelius, 
which "declares that a so-called juristic person is  no  person at all, 
but is  subjectless property destined for a particular purpose (sub-
jektloses Zweckvermogen), that there  is  ownership but no owner. 
This  ilieory,  too,  is  based  upon  the  assumption  iliat  only human 
being,s  can  have  rights.  As  corporations  and  foundations  are  not 
humans, no subject exists in  which ilie  right can be vested". (Wolff, 
1938:  496)  The  third  ilieory,  developed  in  particular  by  Jhering, 
treats  institutions  in  terms  of  the  individuals  (the  members  or 
shareholders of corporations, ilie beneficiaries of foundations) which 
make them up. Wolff argues that this account is unable adequately to 
explain ilie  unity of will  and  the specificity of institutions vis-a-vis 
these individual  agents.  Finally,  there  is  the  organism doctrine, ac-
cording to which 
a legal  person is  a real  personality in an extra-judicial, 
pre-judicial sense of the  word.  In  contra-distinction to 
ilie  others,  this  theory  a:;sumes  that  the  subjects  of 
rights  need  not  be  human  beings,  that  every  being 
which possesses a will and a life of its own may be the 
subject  of  1ights  and  thilt  States,  corporations, 
72 foundations are beings just as alive and just as capable 
of having a will as  are human beings. They are - so it 
says - social organisms just as humans are physical or-
ganisms. Their will ("common will") is  different from 
the will of the founder. Their actions are their own, not 
carried out by  agents or representatives like  those of 
incapables (infants, lunatics), but in the  same way  as 
those of normal adults. Man uses his bodily organs for 
the purpose. Corporations use men. (1938: 498) 
In some sense, of course, the endowment of a non-human entity with 
rationality is  always a fiction, an artifice. But the distinction between 
"legal"  persons  and  "natural"  persons  cannot  be  mapped  onto  a 
simple  dichotomy of nature  and  culture,  because  the  status of the 
"natural" person is  itself constituted by  a juridical demarcation of 
the problematic boundaries of the human: boundaries between foetus 
and child; between the living,  the comatose, the braindead and the 
dead; between the bodies of Siamese twins; between the normal and 
the  subnormal.  Moreover,  "natural"  persons  are  not  necessarily 
coextensive with their bodies. They may, for example, be represen-
ted  by  an agent, acting as  a legal extension of their status as  person 
and able to create rights and incur duties on their behalf. 
Both this constructedness of the natural person, then, and the dis-
tinction  between  legal  and  natural  persons  mean  that  the  general 
concept of "person"  ("legal  subject")  has  no  necessary  or unified 
form.  (Hirst, 1979:  13-14) Processes of registration and certification 
control  the  "recognition"  of  the  status  of both  corporations  and 
human beings; but specific ideological processes of "recognition" (in 
the sense of "self' - recognition:  recognition of the always-already 
subject) apply to the latter. The natural person has distinct conditions 
of constitution (specif1c  institutional  and  practical  conditions), and 
distinct forms of circulation in the different juridical domains (it un-
derpins distinct juridical realities). It is a fully discursive category. 
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